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Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of holding firms liable for non-disclosure
of material information when raising capital. We develop a model in which
a privately-informed entrepreneur can choose to withhold information from
prospective investors when issuing and selling stock and the investors can bring
suit against the firm ex post for (alleged) non-disclosure. The damage payment
received by the investors is partially offset by the reduced value of their equity stake. The analysis shows that the equilibrium depends on, among others,
(1) the amount of personal capital the entrepreneur has to commit, (2) the frequency with which the entrepreneur is privately informed (the degree of adverse
selection), (3) the size of damages payment, and (4) the cost of litigation. Court
errors decrease social welfare by weakening deterrence while litigation costs may
increase social welfare by deterring the inefficient types or decrease social welfare through wasteful litigation spending. The effects of liability or class action
waivers and holding entrepreneurs personally liable for non-disclosure are also
explored, and various normative and empirical implications are discussed.

1

Introduction

On May 17, 2012, Facebook went public by selling more than 421 million shares of
common stock at $38 per share to public investors on the Nasdaq and raised about $16
∗
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billion from the investors. Unlike many other initial public offerings that experience
an initial price surge, Facebook’s stock price declined shortly after the initial public
offering (IPO), hitting a low of $18. It took more than a year for the stock price
to rebound to the IPO price of $38. Many public investors, who bought Facebook’s
shares at the IPO or shortly after, were quite unhappy and brought class action suits
against the company under the US Securities Act, claiming that Facebook failed to
disclose the fact that more users were using their mobile phones to access Facebook’s
websites instead of their computers, and the company’s advertising revenues were
lower than as described in the IPO documents.1 After more than five years of pretrial procedures, immediately before the case was to go to trial, the litigants agreed
to settle the case for $35 million in 2018.2
As the Facebook story demonstrates, when a company raises capital by selling
securities to outside investors, the US securities laws require the company to disclose
relevant material information it possesses to the prospective investors. In case the
company fails to do so, the investors can bring suit against the company to recover
compensatory damages. Presumably, such a liability regime ensures that the outside
investors will receive necessary information from the company to make an informed
decision as to whether to purchase the offered security. At the same time, though,
critics have argued that the private enforcement regime, especially the class action
system, is too costly and encourages indiscriminate lawsuits against even innocent
companies.3 To what extent does such a liability regime induce the company to
disclose relevant material information to the investors? Is such a private liability
regime necessary in the first place? If so, in what form? Should the investors be
allowed to bring class actions or be required to bring suit on an individual basis, as
some advocates have argued? What is the role of the plaintiff class action lawyers?
The objective of this paper is to answer some of these questions with the help of game
theoretic modeling.
The paper presents a model in which an entrepreneur sells stock to the outside
investors while deciding whether to disclose all material information she possesses
to the prospective investors. The investors make rational inferences based on the
entrepreneur’s decision to disclose and, in case it is revealed that the entrepreneur
1

See Atkins (2018) and Graf (2018).
Id. Out of $35 million settlement, plaintiff’s attorneys received almost $14 million as fees and
costs. See Graf (2018). Although the size of settlement in the Facebook case was exceptionally small
compared to the size of the IPO and the potential recovery, according to Lowry and Shu (2002), the
average size of settlement in their sample was about 11% of the total proceeds raised in IPOs.
3
See Scott (2017 and 2019). Scott has argued that most of the securities class actions are without
merit and the companies should be allowed to bar securities class actions through a mandatory nonclass arbitration provision in their charters or bylaws.
2
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hid material information, the investors can bring suit against the company to recover
damages. Notably, the damage payment received by the outside investors is offset in
part by the reduced value of their equity stake. When the entrepreneur must commit
enough of her own resources to the venture, then the entrepreneur will disclose all
material information to the outside investors. In case the entrepreneur does not
need to expend sufficient resources, however, holding the firm liable is necessary to
deter the entrepreneur from withholding bad news. The equilibrium probability of
non-disclosure depends on the frequency with which the entrepreneur is privately
informed (the degree of adverse selection) and the level of liability. Full deterrence
may require damages that are supra-compensatory in the sense that that the damage
payments exceed the overcharge to investors.
After presenting the baseline model, the paper also examines various extensions.
In the first extension, the entrepreneur is held personally liable for withholding information from investors. Since the damage award is paid by the entrepreneur rather
than the firm, the firm’s equity value is unaffected by the lawsuit. We show that the
level of liability required to deter non-disclosure is smaller than in the baseline model.
The second extension allows for the liability system to falsely find uninformed (and
non-disclosing) entrepreneurs liable. With false convictions, it becomes more difficult to deter the informed entrepreneur from not disclosing her information. In the
third extension, the analysis allows for positive litigation costs. With costly litigation,
in certain parameter space of litigation costs, we actually can get better deterrence
against inefficient non-disclosure. Positive litigation costs can, however, also reduce
overall social welfare, especially when the liability system does not deter inefficient
non-disclosure. In such circumstances, it may be social-welfare enhancing to eliminate
firm liability altogether.
This paper extends the literature on the disclosure of information prior to the
sale of an asset. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) introduced the famous unravelling result when sellers are privately informed about asset quality. Sellers of high
quality assets have a clear incentive to disclose this information (to obtain a better
selling price) and, as a consequence, sophisticated buyers draw adverse inferences
when sellers do not disclose. Grossman and Hart (1981) explored the implications of
full unravelling for disclosure laws in corporate takeovers.4 Dye (1985), Farrell (1986),
and Shavell (1994) show that complete unraveling does not occur when buyers are
uncertain whether the sellers actually have private information. In their models, sellers with low quality assets have an incentive to withhold this information from the
4

Grossman and Hart conclude that “the commonly held view that firms withhold information
(which is free to release) in order to mislead traders into giving them better terms is false.” (p. 333)
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market and pool with the uninformed types.5 These papers all assume that disclosure, if mandated, is perfectly enforced and that the seller does not retain an equity
stake in the asset.
Dye (2017) explores a model where mandatory disclosure is imperfectly enforced.
If the seller fails to disclose material information, then the court awards damages
that are proportional to the over-payment by the buyers (relative to what they would
have paid had the seller disclosed the information). Our analysis differs from Dye’s
in several important respects. First, in Dye (2017), the sale of the asset, even the
lowest-value asset, is assumed to be socially efficient.6 In our model, the sale of the
lowest-value asset is socially inefficient; disclosure is socially valuable in our setting
because it prevents the mis-allocation of capital.7 Second, in Dye (2017), the seller is
personally liable for the damage payment. In our analysis, the firm itself is liable for
the damage payment. The seller’s accountability for non-disclosure is limited to their
(endogenous) financial stake in the firm. In our model, the damage award received by
the buyers is paid, in part, by the buyers themselves: The buyers are in effect taking
money out of one pocket and putting it into the other.
Several scholars have also examined the impact on liability system on the securities
markets, especially on the IPO market. Hughes and Thakor (1992), for instance,
examine the idea of an underwriter deliberately under-pricing its stock at the IPO
so as to avoid potential lawsuit ex post. In their analysis, over or under-pricing at
IPO can happen because the underwriter can be either “myopic” or “nonmyopic”
in making its pricing decision.8 Lowry and Shu (2002) empirically examines the
litigation risk on IPO under-pricing and show that firms with higher legal exposure
tend to under-price their offerings more and also that under-pricing decreases the
expected litigation costs.9 Focusing more on the class action securities lawsuits, Scott
5

Shavell (1994) focuses on the incentive of sellers to acquire information prior to a sale. Although
mandatory disclosure may be socially desirable conditional on the seller acquiring the information,
mandatory disclosure may chill the collection of socially valuable information. Polinsky and Shavell
(2012) show that when sellers are strictly liable for consumer harms stemming from defective products, and can take precautions to reduce product risks, then mandatory and voluntary disclosure
are equivalent.
6
Dye’s primary analysis is descriptive, characterizing the effect of liability on disclosure strategies.
7
There are other differences. In Dye (2017), social welfare falls when the seller retains a larger
fraction of the asset. See section 7 in Dye (2017). In our model, increasing the seller’s stake is
socially efficient insofar as it deters sellers with low-value assets from participating.
8
In an earlier paper, Hughes (1986) allows for a privately informed firm to disclose information
to an underwriter who, in turn, verifies the disclosure. Alexander (1993) takes issue with Hughes
and Thakor (1992) and argues that when we take into consideration the more complex legal issues,
it is unlikely that the legal liability will lead to under-pricing of IPO shares.
9
Prior studies showed little or no difference in returns in firms that were sued versus those who
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and Silverman (2013) have argued that the class action system has many deficiencies
and we should allow firms to adopt mandatory individual arbitration when they go
public.10 This paper attempts to examine the issues of disclosure more closely and
to shed some light on the optimal liability system, including whether allowing class
action waivers can be beneficial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. Absent
liability, the entrepreneur has a socially insufficient incentive to disclose bad news
to the investors. Firm liability improves disclosure incentives and leads to a more
efficient allocation of capital. Section 3 examines various extensions, including (1)
placing liability on the entrepreneur (rather than on the firm); (2) court errors where
an uninformed, non-disclosing firm may be falsely held liable too; and (3) positive
litigation costs. In section 4, we analyze the possibility of allowing firms to either
waive the liability or class actions and examine the conditions under which the social
welfare is aligned with the firms’ incentives. Section 5 offers various empirical predictions that the analysis generates and the last section concludes with thoughts for
future research.

2

The Model

Suppose that an entrepreneur E owns a firm that needs capital of c > 0. When
E raises c and incurs a personal cost of e > 0, c + e is invested and the cash-flow
stream of x > 0 is realized, where x ∈ {xh , xl } and prob(x = xl ) = q ∈ (0, 1).11 Let
k ≡ c + e, where k stands for the total investment necessary for the project, and
x ≡ q · xl + (1 − q) · xh . We assume that max{e, c} < xl < k < xh and x > k so
that financing is efficient either when x = xh or when E is uninformed, but not when
x = xl .12
We assume that E raises capital from a competitive capital market by having the
firm sell fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the firm’s equity to outside investors, whose reservation
were not or little difference in characteristics among the cases that were filed. See Tinic (1988),
Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), and Bohn and Choi (1996). See Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ritter
(2011) for a more extensive review of the literature.
10
See also Scott (2017, 2019). Webber (2015), on the other hand, argues that elimination of
the class action system can lead to cross-subsidization by small, individual shareholders to large,
institutional ones.
11
We can think of E’s personal cost of e as either E’s costly effort or the amount of personal
financial capital E has to pledge to get financing.
12
The assumption that e < xl rules out the uninteresting case where the l-type would never
participate, even if α = 0. Also, the assumption that c < xl is made for largely technical convenience.
−k
∈ (0, 1).
Taken together, our assumptions imply that q < q = xxhh−x
l
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value is normalized to zero. For instance, with complete information and when x = xh ,
with competitive capital markets, the outside investors would pay c for a fraction
α = c/xh of the equity of the firm. The outside investors break even in this complete
information scenario, since α · xh − c = (c/xh ) · xh − c = 0.
There are five periods in the game with no discounting, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and the
timing of the game is as follows. At t = 0, Nature chooses x = xl with probability q
and x = xh with probability 1 − q. E learns the realized x with probability π ∈ (0, 1).
E who learns x is “informed” while E who does not learn x is “uninformed.” Among
the informed E, we denote E (and the firm) who knows that x = xh as the “h-type”
and that x = xl , the “l-type.” We denote the uninformed E as the “u-type.” Hence,
there are three possible types of E (or the firm): u-type, h-type, and l-type.
At t = 1, E decides whether to participate and raise capital. If E chooses not to
participate, then the game ends and both the investors and E get a return of zero. If
E chooses to participate, then the game continues.13
At t = 2, the informed E chooses whether to disclose x or not disclose (“withhold”)
x. Following the literature, disclosures are accurate, i.e., E cannot present false
evidence, and that the uninformed E cannot pretend to know x. The outside investors
observe the entrepreneur’s disclosure decision and the disclosed information, if any,
and update their belief about x.
At t = 3, the firm attempts to raise capital c by issuing equity stake α to outside
investors.14 Outside investors are rational and forward looking and the capital market
is competitive. The equity stake α allows investors to break even given their (endogenous) beliefs about the value of the firm x and their returns from future litigation. If
the firm fails to raise capital, then the game ends.15
At t = 4, investments c and e are sunk and all returns are realized. Investors (now,
shareholders of the firm) learn (1) value x ∈ {xh , xl } and (2) whether E withheld
13

We are imagining that E’s choice to participate or not participate is a commitment, and cannot
change her mind later. This will get rid of the equilibria where investors make positive profits and
simplifies the equilibrium characterization.
14
Although the firm can raise capital by issuing debt and the liability system is not confined to
equity securities, because debt tends to be (much) less “information sensitive” and most of the legal
issues arise from stock sales, we focus on equity financing.
15
Initially, we assume that the future litigation system is dictated by the legal system and the
litigation parameters (such as the damages and the cost of litigation) are commonly known. Later,
we will relax this assumption to allow the firm to choose a different liability system, for instance,
through a liability waiver or a class action waiver.

6
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information at t = 2, and can decide to bring a suit against the firm.16 If E withheld
information, the court awards damages d ∈ [0, xl ].17 Note that we are assuming that
the limited liability principle applies and the firm cannot be responsible for more
than its cash-flow (xl ). Also, while it is natural to assume that the damages are
compensatory and equal to the overcharge paid by investors,18 we also allow for no
damages (d = 0) and punitive damages.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). Several
observations will simplify the analysis of this game. First, if the l-type chooses to
participate, it will not disclose xl to the market. To see why, suppose that the l-type
did disclose xl to the market. Investors would demand equity stake αl = c/xl in return
for investing c in the business venture. The l-type’s net return if it participates and
discloses xl is (1 − αl )xl − e = xl − c − e < 0: the l-type is losing money. So, if the
l-type participates at t = 1, it will not disclose xl to the capital market. (Depending
on the parameter values, the l-type may or may not participate in equilibrium.)
Second, in any equilibrium where the l-type participates and raises capital with a
positive probability, the u-type participates, too. To see why, let α∗ be the equilibrium
equity stake demanded by investors when there is no disclosure. The l-type’s return,
(1 − α∗ )xl − e (minus any damages owed to outside investors), is strictly smaller than
the u-type’s return, (1 − α∗ )x − e. So, if the l-type’s financial return is non-negative,
then the u-type’s return is strictly positive.
Finally, in any equilibrium, the h-type will participate in the market, disclose its
information (of xh ), and succeed in raising capital. Since the capital market draws
adverse inferences from non-disclosure, the h-type firm has an incentive to disclose
xh to secure a better deal with investors. These observations are summarized in the
following Lemma.19
16

We are assuming here than the entrepreneur is not directly liable for non-disclosure. Technically,
the security is being sold by and the representations are being made by the firm. Hence, imposing
liability on the firm would seem natural. If we assume that the entrepreneur does not have sufficient
assets to pay for monetary damages, such an assumption may also be realistic. Nevertheless, we
later analyze the case of holding the entrepreneur directly liable for non-disclosure. See section 3.1.
17
For now, we are assuming that there are no “false positives,” the u-type cannot be found liable
for non-disclosure after xl has been realized. We also assume that there are no costs of litigation.
Latter sections will relax these assumptions. See section 3.2
18
Instead of fixed damages d, we can allow the investors to recover max{0, min{θ(αxl − c), xl }}
where θ ∈ [0, ∞). In that case, the analysis on the liability system will examine changes in θ instead
of d. We are adopting d for its analytical simplicity.
19
The formal proof is in the Appendix. Later, we will prove that an equilibrium with u-type
participation always exists. For some parameter values, there will also exist trivial PBNE where the
u-type does not participate, supported by the market’s belief that if there is no disclosure then the
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Lemma 1. In any PBNE where the u-type participates, the h-type participates, discloses xh , and issues equity stake αh = c/xh ; the u-type issues equity stake α∗ ≥
c/x > αh ; the l-type participates with probability β ∗ ∈ [0, 1], does not disclose xl , and
pools with the u-type.
In the analysis that follows, we will construct the PBNE where the h-type participates and discloses, the u-type participates and does not disclose, and the l-type
partially pools with the u-type. In particular, we characterize values (α∗ , β ∗ ) where α∗
is the associated equity stake demanded by investors (conditional on non-disclosure)
and β ∗ is the l-type’s participation probability.

2.1

Full-Information Benchmark

Since xl < k < x < xh , it is socially efficient for the entrepreneur to raise capital
and pursue the venture unless the project is known to have low value (xl ). If a social
planner possessed the same information as the entrepreneur, the social planner would
fund the project if the value was known to be high (x = xh ) or if the project had
unknown value, but not if x = xl . As the following proposition demonstrates, this
outcome would be obtained in a competitive market if the investors have the same
information as the entrepreneur.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the capital market has the same information as the
entrepreneur.
1. If the entrepreneur and capital market learn that x = xh , then the investors pay
c for equity stake αh = c/xh . E’s return is xh − c − e > 0.
2. If the entrepreneur and capital market learn that x = xl , then no capital is
raised. E’s return is zero.
3. If the entrepreneur and capital market do not learn x, then investors pay c for
equity stake α = c/x. E’s return is x − c − e > 0.
The entrepreneur raises capital and pursues the business venture unless the project
is commonly known to be of low value (i.e., unless the market knows x = xl ). Finally,
note that when x is not observed then the equity stake demanded by investors reflects
the average value (x).20 E’s equity stake 1 − α is just large enough to allow the
investors to break even on average.
firm is the l-type for sure. The additional assumption that e < (1 − c/xl )x − e would rule out such
equilibria.
−k
c
20
As q → 0 then x → xh and α → αh . As q → q = xxhh−x
then x → c + e and α → c+e
.
l
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2.2

Equilibrium Characterization

We now characterize the PBNE where the outside investors demand an equity stake
α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and the l-types participate and raise capital with probability β ∗ . Let’s
begin with the l-type’s decision to participate and raise capital. If the l-type participates, the outside investors will bring suit against the firm for damages d. After the
payment of damages to the investors, the residual firm value of xl − d ≥ 0 is divided
between the outside investors and the entrepreneur in proportions α∗ and (1 − α∗ ).
The l-type raises capital if the gross return for the entrepreneur, (1 − α∗ )(xl − d),
exceeds the personal investment e. We have the following characterization of β ∗ :

∗

if (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e < 0
β = 0
(1)
β ∗ ∈ [0, 1] if (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e = 0

 ∗
∗
β =1
if (1 − α )(xl − d) − e > 0
Depending on the level of damages d, the equilibrium may involve full deterrence of
the l-type (β ∗ = 0), partial deterrence (β ∗ ∈ (0, 1)), or no deterrence (β ∗ = 1).
Next, consider the equity stake demanded by outside investors. If the entrepreneur
is the uninformed u-type, by assumption, there is no lawsuit and the investors get,
in expectation, a net return of α∗ x − c. If the entrepreneur is the informed l-type,
the outside investors bring suit and collect damages of d from the firm. Because
the damages are paid by the firm, the value of the outside investors’ equity stake
falls to α∗ (xl − d).21 Thus, the damages awarded to the investors are paid, in part,
by the investors themselves. The investors’ break-even condition (from the ex ante
perspective) is:22
(1 − π)(α∗ x − c) + πqβ ∗ (α∗ xl − c + (1 − α∗ )d) = 0.

(2)

As the investors’ break-even condition shows, the equilibrium α∗ will depend on the
equilibrium probability of participation by the l-type (β ∗ ∈ [0, 1]).
21

We are assuming here that the investors have not sold their shares when they bring suit. We
can relax this assumption later. When the parameters of the lawsuit are common knowledge and
the financial market is sufficiently forward-looking, when the investors sell the stock, the stock price
would reflect the returns from prospective lawsuits. When litigation is costly, however, the credibility
constraint will differ depending on whether the investors have sold their stock. See section 3.3
22
Conditional on non-disclosure by the entrepreneur, the investors’ break-even constraint is:
πq
1−π
(α∗ x − c) +
β ∗ (α∗ xl − c + (1 − α∗ )d) = 0.
(1 − π) + πq
(1 − π) + πq
This is equivalent to (2). The investors’ equilibrium ex ante return from the h-type is αh xh − c = 0.

9
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If the damage award d is above a threshold, l-type entrepreneur will be fully
deterred from raising capital: β ∗ = 0. We now characterize this upper threshold,
d. First, consider the investors’ willingness to supply capital. Setting β ∗ = 0 in the
investors’ break-even condition (2), we have α∗ x−c = 0. Thus, if the outside investors
believe that the l-type entrepreneur is fully deterred, they will demand equity stake
of
c
(3)
α∗ = α = < 1.
x
The equity stake when no information is disclosed reflects the average value of the
uninformed u-type only. Now, consider the l-type’s decision to participate and raise
capital. From (1), the l-type is fully deterred when (1 − α)(xl − d) − e < 0. Since the
left-hand side is a decreasing function of d, the threshold damage award d satisfies
this expression with equality. The following Lemma characterizes this threshold.
Lemma 2. (Full Deterrence.) There exists a threshold d ≥ 0 such that the l-type is
fully deterred, β ∗ (d, π) = 0, if d > d. If e ≥ (1−c/x)xl then d = 0.23 If e < (1−c/x)xl
then
e
> 0.
(4)
d = xl −
1 − c/x
The full-deterrence threshold d in (4) has several notable properties. First, d is
independent of π. With the complete deterrence of the l-type, the outside investors
need not worry about the “degree” of adverse selection, represented by π. Second,
d is a strictly decreasing function of e. Deterrence is easier to achieve when the
entrepreneur has more at stake in the venture. Third, as e approaches 0, d approaches
xl . When the entrepreneur personally invests very little in the venture, full-deterrence
requires damages that effectively liquidate the firm’s assets with nothing remaining
for the entrepreneur. Interestingly, full deterrence may require supra-compensatory
damages in the sense that the investors collect more in damages than the overcharge
for the assets.24 Fourth, when e approaches (1 − c/x)xl , the full-deterrence threshold
d approaches zero. If e ≥ (1 − α)xl then the l-type is fully deterred for all d ≥ d = 0,
so liability is unnecessary for deterrence.25 To streamline the analysis we make the
following assumption.
x−k
Since k = c + e, we can rewrite (1 − c/x)xl = x−x
xl ≡ eb. Then, d < (>)0 when e > (<)b
e.
l
This is true given that d is decreasing in e and d = xl > c − αxl ∀α ∈ (0, 1] when e = 0.
25
In an initial public offering, the insiders (including the founders, officers, and venture capitalists) are often contractually prohibited from selling their stock for a certain period (the “lock-up”
agreement). The entrepreneur making a personal investment of e can be thought of as being similar
to such an arrangement, since without a lock-up agreement, the entrepreneur may be able to divest
her investment quickly after raising capital from the outside investors before any of the informational
issues are uncovered.
23
24

10
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Assumption 1: e < (1 − α)xl .
Assumption 1 implies that in the absence of liability, d = 0, the l-type is less-thanfully deterred.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, if the damage award d is below a threshold,
the l-type entrepreneur will be completely undeterred, β ∗ = 1. Unlike the full deterrence case, with full participation by the l-type, now the degree of adverse selection
(π) matters. The next Lemma characterizes the lower threshold, d(π). As the Lemma
(along with its proof) demonstrates, full participation by the l-type (no deterrence)
becomes more likely as d, π, or both get smaller.
Lemma 3. (No Deterrence.) There exist thresholds d(π) ∈ [0, d] and π
b0 ∈ (0, 1) such
∗
b0 then d(π) = 0. If
that the l-type is undeterred, β (d, π) = 1, if d < d(π). If π > π
π≤π
b0 then
e
d(π) = xl −
(5)
1 − c/x − r(π)
where
r(π) =

πq
k − xl
·
.
1−π
x

(6)

π0 ) = 0, and r(b
π0 ) = 1 − c/x − e/xl .
d(π) is strictly decreasing in π with d(0) = d, d(b
While the formal details are in the proof of Lemma 3, the result may be understood
intuitively. The function r(π) defined in (6) is the incremental equity stake demanded
by the outside investors when the l-type is (just) undeterred, β ∗ = 1. To just break
even in expectation, the outside investors require equity stake c/x + r(π). Intuitively,
if the l-types are undeterred, the outside investors will demand a “premium” to
compensate for the increased risk that they face. The risk premium demanded by
outside investors, r(π) in equation (6), is higher when the fraction of informed types,
π, is larger.
Note also that the threshold d(π) in Lemma 3 is a decreasing function of π. When
π rises, full participation of the l-types is unsustainable in equilibrium. It is not
hard to see why this is true. When π rises and the outside investors demand a
larger equity stake compensate them for the increased risk, the entrepreneur’s cost of
capital becomes higher, too. The higher cost of capital discourages the l-types from
participating in the market. When π is above a threshold π
b0 , therefore, the l-type is
∗
partially deterred (β < 1) even when there is no liability (d = 0). At the same time,
without any liability (d = 0), full deterrence is no longer feasible.
11

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4056233

11

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 220 [2022]

When the damage award is in an intermediate range (d < d < d) the l-type randomizes between participating and not: β ∗ ∈ (0, 1). From (1), the l-type entrepreneur
is indifferent between participating and not if:
(1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e = 0.

(7)

Notice that if e or d rise, the outside ownership stake α∗ must fall. When the entrepreneur must make a larger personal investment in the venture, or faces greater liability for non-disclosure, it is necessary for the entrepreneur’s ownership stake (1−α∗ )
must be larger (to encourage participation).
Using (7) and allows us to rewrite the investors’ break-even condition as:26
(1 − π)(α∗ x − c) − πqβ ∗ (c + e − xl ) = 0.

(8)

The expression, α∗ x − c > 0, is the investors’ net return from the uninformed u-type,
and the expression, c + e − xl = k − xl > 0, is the investors’ loss associated with
the l-type. Notice that the expression k − xl > 0 represents the social loss from the
l-type’s participation. Since the l-type is indifferent between participating and not,
i.e., the l-type’s expected return is equal to zero, the outside investors bear the entire
social loss in expectation. Solving equations (7) and (8) gives unique closed-form
solutions for α∗ and β ∗ . The following Proposition formalizes the results.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the firm is held liable for the l-type entrepreneur’s nondisclosure. Consider thresholds d and d(π) defined in (4) and (5), respectively.
1. Full Deterrence. If d > d, then investors demand equity stake α∗ (d, π) = α =
c/x and the l-type is fully deterred, β ∗ (d, π) = 0.
2. Partial Deterrence. If d(π) ≤ d ≤ d, then investors demand equity stake
α∗ (d, π) = 1 −

e
,
xl − d

(9)

where α∗ (d, π) is decreasing in d and does not depend on π. The l-type is
partially deterred,

e
1
−
x−c
1
−
π
x
−d
l
·
,
(10)
β ∗ (d, π) =
πq
c + e − xl
26

Expression (7) implies α∗ (xl − d)xl − d − e. Substituting this into equation (1) gives the result.
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where β ∗ (d, π) is decreasing in d and π with limd→d β ∗ (d, π) = 0 and, if π ≤ π
b0 ,
∗
limd→d(π) β (d, π) = 1.
3. No Deterrence. If d < d(π), then investors demand equity stake
α∗ (d, π) =

(1 − π)c + πq(c − d)
,
(1 − π)x + πq(xl − d)

(11)

where α∗ (d, π) is decreasing in d and increasing in π. The l-type is undeterred,
β ∗ (d, π) = 1.
The full deterrence and no deterrence equilibria were explained in the earlier
Lemmas. Consider the second case of partial deterrence where d(π) < d < d. The
equilibrium l-type participation rate β ∗ (d, π) characterized (10) has some notable
and intuitive properties. First, the l-type participation rate β ∗ is smaller when the
damage award d is larger. In other words, the l-type is deterred by legal liability.
This is intuitive. When the liability system is stronger then it becomes more costly
for the l-type to not disclose the information, and therefore easier to partially deter
the l-type from participating in the market. Second, the l-type’s participation rate
β ∗ is decreasing in π, the fraction of informed entrepreneurs.27 When π is larger, the
adverse selection problem is worse. To maintain investor indifference, fewer l-types
participate. In the limit, when π → 1, β ∗ → 0: when the entrepreneur is perfectly
informed, the full unraveling result (Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981)) obtains.
For comparison, we know from Lemma 3 that when π → 0, β ∗ = 1 ∀d < d, and
welfare loss again goes to zero. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1.

2.3

Welfare Implications

It is straightforward to evaluate the implications for private and social welfare. In the
PBNE, the h-type and u-type participate with certainty while the l-type participates
with probability β ∗ (d, π) ∈ [0, 1]. From an ex ante perspective, the expected social
welfare is SW (d, π) is given by:
SW (d, π) = (1 − π)(x − k) + π(1 − q)(xh − k) + πqβ ∗ (d, π)(xl − k).

(12)

The first and second terms, which are positive, reflect the value created by the utypes and h-types, respectively. The third term, which is negative, is the welfare loss
associated with the l-type’s participation: πq is the probability that the entrepreneur
is the l-type and β ∗ is the probability of l-type’s non-disclosure and participation.
27

Recall that x = qxl + (1 − q)xh and does not depend on π.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Characterization
As assumed earlier, it is inefficient for the l-type entrepreneurs to participate in the
market because the gross return from the venture, xl , is smaller than the cost of the
venture, k = c + e.
Equation (12) reveals some important comparative statics. First, since β ∗ (d, π)
is a (weakly) decreasing function of d, social welfare is also a (weakly) increasing
function of d. Second, one can show that social welfare is (weakly) increasing in
π, the proportion of informed entrepreneurs. When firm liability is low (d < d(π))
and the l-type is undeterred (β ∗ (d, π) = 1), we have SW (d, π) = x − k and social
welfare does not depend on π.28 When firm liability is sufficiently high (d > d) so
that β ∗ (d, π) = 0, social welfare is increasing with respect to π. This is because,
with the l-type’s participation probability of zero, as π increases, the proportion of
h-type increases, which increases social welfare since xh > x. Finally, with partial
deterrence (β ∗ (d, π) ∈ (0, 1)), as we saw earlier, β ∗ (d, π) decreases with respect to π,
which increases social welfare. In the extreme, if the entrepreneur is informed with
certainty (π = 1), there would be full unraveling and the first-best outcome would
be obtained. More generally, the society is better off as the entrepreneur has more
information.
Now consider the entrepreneur’s payoff. Not surprisingly, as d gets larger, the
28

Since the l-type participates with certainty, the average welfare from an informed entrepreneur,
some of whom are h-types and disclose xh and others who are l-types and do not disclose their types,
is simply x − k.
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l-type gets (weakly) worse off. More interestingly, as d gets larger, the u-type is
better off. Suppose that the l-type participates with a positive probability. As d
rises, investors expect to receive a larger “rebate” when they sue the l-types for
non-disclosure. As a consequence, the equity stakes demanded by outside investors
α∗ (d, π) in equations (9) and (11) are decreasing in d. Higher levels of liability benefit
the u-type. Finally, consider the effect of π on the entrepreneur’s payoff. When
β ∗ (d, π) = 0 or β ∗ (d, π) ∈ (0, 1), the payoffs are independent of π. This is true in
the latter case because α∗ (d, π) is independent of π. When d < d(π), as π rises,
the investors are facing a larger risk from the l-types and therefore demand a larger
equity stake (α∗ (d, π) is larger). This reduces the payoff of both the u-type and the
l-type.29
The following corollary summarizes the effect of d and π on both social welfare
and private payoffs.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the firm is held liable for the l-type’s non-disclosure.
1. Full Deterrence. If d > d, private payoffs and social welfare do not depend on d.
Private payoffs are independent of π but social welfare increases as π increases.
2. Partial Deterrence. If d(π) ≤ d ≤ d, the l-type’s payoff is independent of d and
π, the u-type’s payoff is increasing in d and π, and social welfare is increasing
in d and π.
3. No Deterrence. If d < d(π), the l-type’s payoff is decreasing in d and π, the
u-type’s payoff is increasing in d and decreasing in π, and social welfare is
independent of d and π.

3

Extensions

The previous section presented the baseline model. While the model delivered important insights, it also relied on several simplifying assumptions, such as no litigation
costs and no false positives. In this section, we relax these assumptions and consider
three extensions: (1) the possibility of holding the entrepreneur personally liable; (2)
the possibility that the court can find u-type entrepreneur liable (false positives); and
(3) positive litigation costs for both the defendant-firm and the plaintiff-shareholders.

29

Note that although the h-type is no worse off when π increases, there are more h-types when π
and social welfare is unaffected.
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3.1

Entrepreneur Liability

Suppose that an informed E may be held personally liable (and the firm is not held
liable) for withholding evidence about x. The outside investors, after observing the
realized x, can bring suit against the entrepreneur at t = 4 to recover damages d.
Since the damage award is paid by the entrepreneur instead of the firm, the value of
the firm’s equity is unaffected by the lawsuit.
Not surprisingly, holding the entrepreneur personally liable creates stronger deterrence. To see why, consider the case of partial deterrence where the l-type is just
indifferent between participating and not and the outside investors break even in
expectation. The l-type is indifferent if
(1 − α∗ )xl − e − d = 0.

(13)

Comparing this condition to (7) reveals an important difference. When the entrepreneur is personally liable he bears one hundred percent of the damage award
d rather than bearing only their proportional share via the reduction in firm value,
(1 − α∗ )d. The outside investors’ break-even condition is the same as in (8) above.
As in the baseline model, if d is above a threshold, the l-type entrepreneur is fully
deterred: β ∗ = 0. The investors’ break-even condition in (8) implies that the outside
investors demand equity stake α∗ = c/x as in (3). Equation (13) implies that the
l-type is just indifferent between participating and not when d > dEL (e) where
dEL = (1 − c/x)xl − e.

(14)

Comparing this to equation (4), we see that dEL < d, the threshold in the baseline
model with firm liability. That is, the l-type is fully deterred for a broader range of
parameter values than before.
Similarly, if the damages d are at the threshold where the l-type is (just) undeterred, β ∗ = 1, then the outside investors demand equity stake c/x + r(π) defined in
(6). Using the l-type’s indifference condition (13)
dEL (π) = (1 − c/x − r(π))xl − e.

(15)

Comparing this to equation (5) establishes dEL (π) < d(π), so the l-type is undeterred
for a smaller range of parameter values than before. When π = 0 then the risk
premium r(π) = 0 and dEL (0) = dEL , and when π = π
b0 then r(b
π0 ) = 1 − c/x − e/xl
and dEL (b
π0 ) = 0. The following proposition presents these findings.

16

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/220
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4056233

16

Choi and Spier:

Figure 2: Entrepreneur Liability
Proposition 3. (Entrepreneur Liability.) Suppose that the entrepreneur is held personally liable for non-disclosure. Consider thresholds dEL and dEL (π) defined in (14)
and (15), respectively.
∗
1. Full Deterrence. If d > dEL , then investors demand equity stake αEL
(d, π) = c/x
∗
and the l-type is fully deterred, βEL (d, π) = 0.

2. Partial Deterrence. If dEL (π) ≤ d ≤ dEL , then investors demand equity stake
∗
αEL
(d, π) = 1 −

d+e
.
xl

(16)

The l-type is partially deterred,

d+e
1
−
x−c
1
−
π
x
∗
l
βEL
(d, π) =
·
∈ [0, 1].
πq
k − xl

(17)

3. No Deterrence. If d < dEL (π), then investors demand equity stake
∗
αEL
(d, π) =

(1 − π)c + πq(c − d)
.
(1 − π)x + πqxl

(18)

∗
The l-type is undeterred, βEL
(d, π) = 1.

These results are illustrated in Figure 2. Notice that since dEL < d, the l-type
17
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entrepreneur is fully deterred for a larger range of parameter values than in the
baseline model. Furthermore, since dEL (π) < d(π), the range where there is no
deterrence is smaller, too. When d = 0, since there is no liability against either the
firm or the entrepreneur, we get the same cut-off point of π
b0 . For the middle range
∗
with partial deterrence, one can easily verify that βEL (d, π) in equation (17) is smaller
than β ∗ (d, π) in equation (10). So deterrence is stronger when the entrepreneur is
held personally liable for non-disclosure to outside investors. Finally, although holding
the entrepreneur personally liable changes the respective regions (full, partial, or no
deterrence regions), within each region, a change in d or π have the same effects on
firm payoffs and social welfare as those in corollary 1. Formal statements are in the
appendix.

3.2

False Positives

In the baseline model, we assumed that only the l-type could be found liable when
the investors observe xl while the u-type, when it generates the revenue of xl is
not found liable. This is tantamount to assuming that when xl is observed, the
investors (and the court) can distinguish whether it is the l-type or the u-type that
has generated that cash-flow xl or, equivalently, the investors (and the court) to
know whether the entrepreneur had earlier concealed the information on future cashflow. Such informational assumption, of course, may be strong especially when the
investors (and the court) need to verify whether the entrepreneur, in fact, concealed
information at the time of financing. In this section, we relax that assumption and
allow for the possibility of the court holding also the u-type (falsely) liable.
Suppose, after the investors have financed the project conditional on non-disclosure
and xl has been observed, the investors do not know whether they are facing the ltype or the u-type, and can bring lawsuit against either one. As before, if the lawsuit
is brought against the l-type, the l-type will be liable (in expectation) for d. On the
other hand, we assume that the liability for the u-type is given by λd where λ ∈ [0, 1].
The court is (weakly) competent at distinguishing the types. If λ = 0, for instance,
we’re back to the baseline model. To focus on the impact of allowing false positives,
we’ll continue to assume that litigation is costless.30
It is not difficult to imagine that once the court (and the investors) can falsely
hold the u-type liable (after xl is realized), it becomes more difficult to deter the
30

The baseline model implicitly takes into account the possibility of false negatives through a
reduction in d, but we can make this more express by letting the l-type to be liable for µd, with
0 ≤ λ ≤ µ ≤ 1, where µ can stand for the probability of finding l-type liable. The main results will
stay the same.
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l-type from participating. For instance, the region where the l-type participates in
equilibrium will be larger and in the region where the l-type is partially deterred,
the l-type will participate with a higher probability. As will be demonstrated more
formally in the following proposition and the proof, the l-type is fully deterred, β ∗ = 0,
when the damages exceed the threshold
d F P = xl −

e
1 − αF P

(19)

c−qλd
where αF P = x−qλd
. Since the investors expect a “rebate” λd from the u-type, they
demand a smaller fraction of the firm, αF P < α = c/x. Comparing the formula for
dF P in (19) to the formula for d in (4) we see that dF P > d whenever λ > 0. The
l-type is totally undeterred, β ∗ = 1, when the damages are below the threshold

e
1 − αF P − rF P (π)

dF P (π) = xl −

(20)

where rF P (π) is the risk premium required by the investors when d = rF P (π),
rF P (π) =

πq
k − xl
·
.
1 − π x − qλd

(21)

Comparing these expressions with (5) and (6) verifies that dF P (π) > d(π). The
following proposition, along with the proof, demonstrates this more formally.
Proposition 4. (False Positives.) Suppose that the firm is erroneously held liable for
λd when the entrepreneur is uninformed and xl is realized, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider
thresholds dF P and dF P (π) defined in (19) and (20), respectively.
1. Full Deterrence. If d > dF P , then investors demand equity stake αF∗ P (d, π) =
c−qλd
and the l-type is fully deterred, βF∗ P (d, π) = 0.
x−qλd
2. Partial Deterrence. If dF P (π) ≤ d ≤ dF P , then investors demand equity stake
αF∗ P (d, π) = 1 −

e
.
xl − d

(22)

and the l-type is partially deterred,
1−π 1−
βF∗ P (d, π) =
·
πq

e
xl −d


(x − qλd) − (c − qλd)
k − xl

∈ [0, 1].

(23)
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Figure 3: False Positives
3. No Deterrence. If d < dF P (π), then investors demand equity stake
αF∗ P (d, π) =

(1 − π)(c − qλd) + πq(c − d)
.
(1 − π)(x − qλd) + πq(xl − d)

(24)

The l-type is undeterred, βF∗ P (d, π) = 1.
While the general attributes of the equilibrium is similar to that in the baseline
case, when the court can falsely find the u-type liable (λ > 0), there are three notable
differences. First, compared to the baseline case, now it becomes more difficult to
achieve full deterrence: dF P (e) > d(e) ∀π ∈ [0, 1] whenever λ > 0. Because the
investors collect some damages (λd) from the u-type when xl is observed, ex ante,
they demand a lower fraction of the firm (α∗ is smaller) and this provides a stronger
incentive for the l-type to not disclose and participate. Second, and for similar reasons,
the region where there is no deterrence (β ∗ = 1) is larger: dF P (e, π) > d(e, π) ∀π ∈
[0, π
b0 (e)) whenever λ > 0. Third, when the l-type is partially deterred (β ∗ ∈ (0, 1)),
even with the same level of liability (the same d), with false positives, the l-type
participates with a higher probability. Conditional on d, because the investors collect
damages from the u-type, their expected return will be higher with false positives.
In order to satisfy their break-even condition, therefore, the l-type has to participate
with a higher probability. When compared to the baseline case, all three results
will tend to lower social welfare. A formal analysis of comparative statics are in the
appendix.
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3.3

Litigation Costs

In the baseline model and the two extensions we have analyzed so far, we have assumed
that litigation was costless, so the investors brought suit against the firm whenever
the l-type participated (and xl is observed). This section relaxes this assumption,
and assumes that the investors and the firm must pay litigation costs of φp ≥ 0 and
φd ≥ 0, respectively. We let φ = φp + φd .
When litigation is costly, the outside investors may not have a financial interest
to bring suit against the firm even after discovering the l-type’s non-disclosure. The
investors’ net return from the litigation is (weakly) positive whenever d − φp ≥ 0.31
However, the market value of the equity stake held by the investors falls. After the
payment of damages d and defense costs φd , the value of the firm’s equity is xl −d−φd .
Since the outside investors own fraction α of the equity, their stake falls by α(d + φd ).
The outside investors will bring suit if and only if the net return from litigation
exceeds the the lost equity value:
α≤

d − φp
.
d + φd

(25)

The outside investors’ incentive to sue the firm is stronger when the damages d are
higher, their equity stake α is smaller, or the litigation costs φp and φd smaller. Notice
that the credibility constraint does not depend on π, c, or e.32
Suppose that (25) is satisfied so the investors’ have an incentive to bring the
lawsuit. As in the baseline model, there exists a threshold dLC above which the ltype entrepreneur is fully deterred: β ∗ = 0. In an equilibrium with full deterrence,
there is no litigation and the outside investors demand equity stake α = c/x, just as
in the baseline model. The l-type is just indifferent between participating and not
when (1 − c/x)(xl − d − φd ) − e = 0, so the l-type does not participate when
dLC = xl − φd −

e
.
1 − c/x

(26)

Comparing this to equation (4) establishes dLC < d since φd > 0. In other words,
31

If the plaintiff-investors have no stake in the firm (e.g., because they have sold their shares
before filing suit) or if they are trying to hold the entrepreneur personally liable, this inequality will
determine the credibility constraint.
32
Note that in the conventional litigation model (with no fee-shifting), plaintiffs bring suit (lawsuit
is credible) whenever d − φp > 0. Since α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and d + φd > d − φp , the credibility constraint is
more likely to bind in our setup. See Choi and Spier (2018) for a more general discussion on how the
plaintiff’s short or long position on the defendant can affect the litigation credibility and outcome.
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when litigation is costly for the firm, the l-type is fully deterred for a broader range of
parameter values than before. Before we proceed, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: α <

dLC − φp
.
dLC + φd

This assumption ensures that when the damages are large enough (d ≥ dLC ), litigation
is credible to fully deter the l-type from participating. The assumption is made to
simplify the analysis and also to make the case more interesting.
The boundary for the partial deterrence region is:
dLC (π) = xl − φd −

e
,
1 − c/x − rLC (π)

(27)

where rLC (π) is the risk premium demanded by investors when d = dLC ,
rLC (π) =

πq
k + φ − xl
·
.
1−π
x

(28)

Comparing these expressions with (5) and (6) verifies that dLC (π) < d(π).
If (25) is not satisfied then investor’s incentive to bring the lawsuit is not credible.
Intuitively, this situation is similar to our baseline model without litigation costs when
d = 0. Following the logic surrounding Lemma 3, when π < π
b0 then d(π) > 0 and
∗
so the l-type is undeterred, β = 1. When π is small, the investors face little risk of
financing an l-type and so the risk premium that they demand is small. This implies
that the (rare) l-types have access to cheap capital, and participate fully in raising
capital. When π > π
b0 then d(π) < 0 and so the l-type is partially deterred. Intuitively,
when π is large, the investors face considerable risk when supplying capital. Since
capital is more expensive, the l-types are partially deterred.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the investors and the firm bear costs φp and φd , respectively, in litigation. There exists a continuous, weakly increasing function d0 (π)
(“litigation credibility threshold”). If d < d0 (π), then investors do not have a credible
threat to sue and the PBNE is the same as the baseline model with d = 0 (Proposition
2). If d ≥ d0 (π), then there exists a PBNE where the investors have a credible threat
to sue.33 Thresholds dLC and dLC (π) are defined in (26) and (27), respectively.
33

There is a second PBNE where investors do not have a credible threat to sue for a certain range
of parameter values with d ≥ d0 (π).
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Figure 4: Litigation Costs
∗
(d, π) =
1. Full Deterrence. If d > dLC , then investors demand equity stake αLC
∗
α = c/x and the l-type is fully deterred, βLC (d, π) = 0.

2. Partial Deterrence. If dLC (π) ≤ d ≤ dLC , then investors demand equity stake
∗
αLC
(d, π) = 1 −

e
.
xl − d − φd

(29)

The l-type is partially deterred,
∗
βLC
(d, π)


e
1 − π 1 − xl −d−φd x − c
·
∈ [0, 1].
=
πq
k + φ − xl

(30)

3. No Deterrence. If d < dLC (π), then investors demand equity stake
∗
(d, π) =
αLC

(1 − π)c + πq(c + φp − d)
.
(1 − π)x + πq(xl − d − φd )

(31)

∗
The l-type is undeterred, βLC
(d, π) = 1.

When damages are below the litigation credibility threshold, d < d0 (π), in equilibrium, the investors decline to bring lawsuits against the firm; the direct cost of
litigation, φp , plus the dilution in the value of their equity stake (which also reflects
the firm’s litigation cost φd ), outweigh the damage award d. The entrepreneur and
23
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the investors are forward-looking and anticipate that there will be no litigation in the
∗
∗
future. Thus, if d < d0 (π), the l-type’s participation rate βLC
and equity stake αLC
demanded by investors follow the analysis of our baseline model with no litigation
costs and d = 0 (see Proposition 2). As illustrated in the gray region of Figure 4, the
equilibrium involves no deterrence when d < π
b0 and partial deterrence if d ≥ π
b0 .
When d ≥ d0 (π), investors have a credible threat to sue, where the direct cost of
litigation (φp ) and the dilution in value of the investors’ equity stake from litigation are
small enough (when compared to damages) to make litigation credible. As shown in
Proposition 5 and illustrated in Figure 4, with d ≥ d0 (π), we may get full deterrence,
partial deterrence, or no deterrence. As in our baseline model, when the damages are
large enough, d ≥ dLC , we get the full deterrence and the l-type does not participate
(case 1) and when d < dLC (π) we get either partial deterrence (case 2) or no deterrence
∗
∗
(case 3). Notice that equilibrium strategies (αLC
and βLC
) depend on the litigation
costs (φp and φd ). It is easy to check that as litigation costs go to zero in these
expressions, we get the earlier equilibrium in Proposition 2.
Litigation costs have nuanced effects on social welfare. There are three factors to
consider with positive litigation cost: deterrence, credibility, and the social cost of
litigation. First, assuming that litigation is credible, because the firm has to pay more
in litigation (they have to pay litigation cost φd in addition to damages d), this creates
stronger deterrence incentives for the l-type and increases social welfare. Indeed, as
shown in Figure 4, the full deterrence region is larger and the no-deterrence region is
smaller than in the baseline model (dLC > d and dLC < d). Second, when litigation
becomes too expensive for the investors, then the investors will no longer bring suit,
compromising deterrence and generally reducing social welfare. This is illustrated by
the gray region in Figure 4. Finally, holding all else equal, the litigation costs are
a social waste and thus increasing litigation costs reduces social welfare. In the nodeterrence region of Figure 4, increasing the litigation costs (on the margin) has no
offsetting social benefits. The local comparative statics are described in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. (Local Comparative Statics.) Suppose that the investors and the firm
bear costs φp and φd , respectively. If d < d0 (π) then private payoffs and social welfare
do not depend on φp , φd , or d. If d ≥ d0 (π), we have the following:
1. Full Deterrence. If d > dLC , private payoffs and social welfare do not depend
on φp , φd , or d.
2. Partial Deterrence. If dLC (π) ≤ d ≤ dLC , the l-type’s payoff is independent of
φd and d, the u-type’s payoff is increasing in φd and d, and social welfare is
increasing in φd and d. Private payoffs and social welfare do not depend on φp .
24
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3. No Deterrence. If d < dLC (π), the l-type’s payoff, the u-type’s payoff, and social
welfare are decreasing in φp and φd . The l-type’s payoff is decreasing in d, the
u-type’s payoff is increasing in d, and social welfare does not depend on d.

4

Liability and Class Action Waivers

In the baseline model and the extensions we have analyzed so far, we have assumed
that the liability system (d and φ) is predetermined and known by the players. (The
case of no liability was implicitly analyzed along the horizontal axis in Figure 1
where d = 0.) The liability system was also assumed to be mandatory. One of
the important debates in this area (particularly with respect to the federal securities
laws) is whether to allow the firms to choose a different liability system. As alluded
to briefly in the introduction, one prominent discussion is over whether to allow the
firms (notably, at the time of their initial public offerings) to opt out of class actions
by contractually requiring individual arbitration on the investors. We can analyze
this issue by giving the firm a choice (at t = 3) over the liability system. Given
that a mandatory individual arbitration system can lead to de facto liability waiver
and that an examination of a different litigation format necessitates an assumption
of positive litigation cost, we divide the discussion into two parts: liability waivers
and class action waivers.
Before we proceed to a more detailed discussion, we start with a few general
observations. Whether the firm will adopt either type of waiver and whether the
firm’s choice is welfare increasing depends on a few factors. With respect to the firm’s
incentive, given that the l-type wants to pool with the u-type in equilibrium, the l-type
will mimic the u-type choice (over waiver) and the firm’s equilibrium choice depends
on the u-type’s incentive.34 Given that the u-type’s return is given by (1 − α∗ )x − e,
the u-type will prefer a policy that will generate a lower α∗ . From the social welfare
perspective, however, the welfare depends on the l-type’s equilibrium participation
rate (β ∗ ) and the cost of litigation (φ): by decreasing β ∗ and φ, the social welfare will
increase. Note here the potential divergence between the private (u-type’s) incentive
and the social welfare. Whether the u-type’s incentive coincides with improving social
welfare depends on the equilibrium that we operate in.

34

If the l-type did not mimic the u-type, then the market would rationally infer that it is a socially
wasteful venture.
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4.1

Liability Waivers

Suppose, at the time of offering its equity to outside investors (at t = 3), the firm
(and the entrepreneur) can opt out of the liability system through a liability waiver.
From the model, this would be equivalent to setting d = 0. For the h-type, having
the option of waiving liability doesn’t matter, since the entrepreneur will disclose
her information to the investors and there would be no ex post liability. As briefly
discussed earlier, given that the l-type’s incentive is to mimic the u-type and get
financed, whether the firm will impose a liability waiver depends on the u-type’s
incentive, which may or may not align with maximizing social welfare. We now
discuss the incentives of the u-type and l-type to waive liability, and the divergence
between their private incentives and the social incentives. The discussion is divided
into two settings: when litigation is costless (φ = 0) and when litigation is costly
(φ > 0).
Suppose that litigation is costless (φ = 0) as in Proposition 2. As described in
Corollary 1, the u-type’s payoff is (weakly) increasing (i.e., α∗ is (weakly) decreasing)
in d. This is the case for two reasons. First, when the investors can recover higher
damages d from the l-type, this can lower the l-type’s participation rate (β ∗ falls)
and, as a result, the investors would demand a lower α∗ from the non-disclosing
entrepreneur. Second, even if the l-type is undeterred and participates with certainty
(β ∗ = 1), the investors know that they can recover damages d from the l-type and
they will demand a lower fraction of the firm (α∗ ) ex ante.35 Thus, when β ∗ = 1, the
liability system shifts rents from the l-type to the u-type. Note that the l-type has
an incentive to mimic and pool with the u-type. If the l-type demanded a liability
waiver while the u-type did not, this would signal to the capital market that the firm
is withholding bad news. In sum, when litigation is costless, neither the l-type nor
the u-type will waive liability in equilibrium. The private incentives are aligned with
the social incentives, since social welfare is higher (β ∗ is weakly lower) with liability
than without it.36
When litigation is costly (Proposition 5), there is the third factor that comes into
play: the potential deadweight loss from litigation, measured by φ. Given that a
positive litigation cost imposes a litigation credibility constraint, we need to examine
two regions (two sub-cases) separately. As shown in Corollary 2, when litigation is not
credible, d ≤ d0 (π), both the u-type and the l-type are indifferent to the possibility
35

In fact, if the firm were also allowed to choose the damages, the u-type will choose d ≥ d so as
to completely deter the l-type from pooling with the u-type.
36
If β ∗ (0) = β ∗ (d) = 1, social welfare is the same with or without liability, since liability simply
shifts rents from the l-type to the u-type. The private parties will not waive liability, as the u-type’s
preferences prevail.
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of waiving liability, since both types know that lawsuits will not be brought. Social
welfare is also unaffected by their choice. With non-credible litigation, it is as if
liability waiver has been imposed on the firm and the investors.
When litigation is credible (d > d0 (π)), on the other hand, the effects are more
complicated. When there is no deterrence and the l-type is participating with certainty (β ∗ = 1), as shown in case 3 of Corollary 2, the the u-type’s return is higher
(equilibrium α∗ is lower) with liability than without. Hence, the u-type would not
waive liability and the l-type will mimic. However, given that the l-type is undeterred
(β ∗ = 1) with or without liability, imposing liability reduces social welfare by imposing a deadweight loss of φ. When β ∗ = 1, the private incentives to waive liability are
socially insufficient and there is too much costly litigation in equilibrium.
Now suppose litigation is credible (d > d0 (π)), but we have partial deterrence
against the l-type’s participation (β ∗ ∈ (0, 1)). Similar to the previous case of no
deterrence, here the u-type will generally prefer having the liability system (i.e., not
waiving liability). With a positive return from ex post litigation, the investors will
demand a lower α∗ for investing c and this will increase the u-type’s equilibrium
return. As shown in the proof of Proposition 5, with liability, the l-type’s equilibrium
participation rate (β ∗ ) will also decrease. Social welfare is also aligned with the utype’s incentive. As seen in the proof for Corollary 2, social welfare goes up with
liability than without. Because the investors break even and, with partial deterrence,
the l-type is indifferent about participating, the u-type becomes the de facto residual
claimant, thereby aligning its incentive with social welfare.

4.2

Class Action Waivers

Another important policy tool is to allow the firm to waive class actions or to
choose the dispute resolution forum (instead of opting out of the liability system
altogether).37 One particular mechanism that has received much attention over the
years is to allow the firm to impose a mandatory individual arbitration or class action
waiver provision on the investors and thereby prohibit investors from bringing a class
action lawsuit (Scott and Silverman (2013) and Webber (2015)). While there are
numerous legal differences between class and individual (arbitration) actions, one important benefit of class actions is the economies of scale: it allows individual plaintiffs
to aggregate their claims and lower the per-plaintiff cost of litigation (Choi and Spier
(2021, 2022)). In our setup, by allowing class actions (i.e., by not imposing class
action waivers), the firm allows future investor-plaintiffs to aggregate their claims
37

See Aggarwal et al. (2020) on the analysis of firms’ confining federal Securities Law litigation
to federal forum.
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and lower their litigation cost (from φp to φcp , where φcp < φp ). For simplicity, we will
assume that the class action system has no effect on the defendant’s litigation cost
(φd remains unchanged).
Given that a class action waiver affects the plaintiff’s litigation cost (φp ), the
analysis is done in the setting where litigation cost is positive. In terms of the firm’s
incentive of allowing class actions (or imposing a class action waiver), as with the
liability waiver case, the h-type will be indifferent with respect to class actions since
it will not be found liable ex post. Similarly, whether the u-type and the l-type will
impose a class action waiver depends on the u-type’s incentive (in trying to lower α∗ ).
When litigation is not credible (d ≤ d0 (π)), since there is no litigation in equilibrium,
the u-type would be indifferent to allowing class actions (class action waivers are
irrelevant) and the l-type will mimic. Social welfare is also unaffected.
Now, suppose, without class actions, litigation is credible (d > d0 (π)). Suppose,
first, that the l-type is undeterred (β ∗ = 1). As shown in the proof of Corollary 2,
by decreasing φp , because the investors’ litigation return increases, they demand a
lower α∗ . That is, the u-type will strictly prefer to allow class actions (i.e., lower
the plaintiff’s litigation cost to φcp ) and the l-type will follow. This is good for social
welfare as well, since with the certain participation by the l-type (β ∗ = 1), lowering the
plaintiff’s litigation cost reduces the deadweight loss. On the other hand, if the l-type
is only partially deterred (β ∗ ∈ (0, 1)), as shown in Proposition 5, in equilibrium, α∗ is
independent of φp . With this, the u-type would be indifferent to class action waivers.
Furthermore, as shown in Corollary 2, social welfare is independent of φp . Hence, the
u-type’s (and the mimicking l-type’s) decision is aligned with social welfare.
One complicating issue is what happens when litigation becomes credible when
class action is allowed (i.e., there is a shift in equilibrium). From the proof of Proposition 5 and not surprisingly, we know that when φp decreases, d0 (π) decreases.38
Hence, for a given (π, d), it is possible that when we lower the plaintiff’s litigation
cost from φp to φcp , litigation becomes credible. It is fairly straightforward to see
that, when this shift happens, investors will demand a lower α and the u-type will
benefit. At the same time, social welfare may actually fall, especially when we are
initially in the no deterrence region, since allowing litigation in equilibrium without
any deterrence benefit will only impose a deadweight loss. In such case, the u-type’s
(and the mimicking l-type’s) decision to allow class actions is socially excessive.
38

We also know that, when class action is imposed, dLC does not change while dLC (π) increases
(except when π = 0). The reason for the latter is that, with partial deterrence, a marginal decrease
in φp increases the investors’ ex ante return and to maintain the investors’ break-even condition, the
l-type has to participate with a higher probability.
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5

Empirical Predictions

In addition to the normative implications regarding liability and class action waivers,
the analysis also renders a number of empirical predictions. The first prediction is
with respect to private securities litigation. The results imply that as the fraction of
outside ownership (α) rises, holding constant the (expected) recovery, investors are
less inclined to bring private securities lawsuits against the firm. Griffith and Lund
(2020), for instance, found that even though shareholder litigation offers potential
benefits for large mutual funds with buy-and-hold strategy, they have essentially
“forfeited” their right to bring litigation.39 From the model, when an institutional
shareholder owns a large fraction of a firm’s outstanding equity, the shareholder would
be much less inclined to file or actively participate in a lawsuit since the net return
from litigation would be much smaller or even non-existent. In fact, when class action
lawsuits are filed by other investors, such as retail investors with little or no ownership
stake in the firm, the institutional investors with a large ownership interest may be
more inclined to have the lawsuits dismissed or be settled relatively quickly.40
The second set of implications is with respect to initial public offering and a
possible way of estimating the size of the deterrence effect. As the analysis shows,
as the level of deterrence gets weaker, because the probability with which the ltype participates in financing (without disclosing bad news) gets (weakly) higher,
over-pricing at the initial offerings becomes more frequent (while the fraction IPOs
that is under-priced gets lower).41 At the same time, while the frequency of overpricing goes up with lower deterrence, as the rational investors begin to discount the
stock more (i.e., demand a larger α in the model), the (average) size of over-pricing
should become smaller (and the (average) size of under-pricing becomes larger). In
addition to making implications about IPO over and under-pricing, this implication
also offers a way of (indirectly) measuring the level of deterrence, i.e., by estimating
the frequency and size of over-pricing (or under-pricing) at IPOs.
39

See also Webber (2015).
Choi and Spier (2018), for instance, discuss scenarios where shareholders with a long position
on the firm would be more willing to accept relatively low settlement amount.
41
Using a sample of IPOs from 1965 through 2005, Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) show that
while on average, IPOs are under-priced, about one-third of IPOs are over-priced (had a negative
return, measured over twenty trading days after the IPO). Our model is constructed using the
fraction of the firm (α) sold to the investors, but we can easily translate the result using per-share
price. Suppose both the l-type and the u-type firms have n total number of shares and sell m
shares to the outside investors, so that m/n = α. Conditional on non-disclosure, if the investors’
expected valuation of the firm is v, we get p = v/n, where p stands for the IPO price. We also
have v = γxl + (1 − γ)x, where γ stands for the conditional probability of facing the l-type (which
depends on β). As γ rises (when β rises), the fraction of IPOs that are over-priced increases but
because v falls, the size of over-pricing (measured by (v − xl )/n) decreases.
40
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The third set of empirical implications deals with when we may be able to observe
better or worse deterrence. Foremost, the model shows that when the size of litigation
recovery (d) is small and/or the degree of adverse selection (π) is small, the firms (and
the entrepreneurs) are much less likely to be deterred (they participate with a high
β ∗ ). As the Facebook example in the introduction shows, most of securities class
actions are settled and many are settled for relatively small amount (compared to the
potential recovery).42 If we think that the investors expect to receive relatively little
from future securities litigation, they expect that the small damages will produce
little or no deterrence and will simply take strategic non-disclosure as given. On the
other hand, as analyzed in the extensions, as more liability is imposed not on the
firm but on the entrepreneur, we get better deterrence. Also, the possibility of false
positives will lead not only to lower deterrence but also to more “innocent” firms
being prosecuted.

6

Conclusion

Under the current legal system, when a firm sells its stock (or other securities) to
outside investors to raise capital, the firm can be held liable to the investors for nondisclosure of material information. Although the general objective of the liability
system is to discourage firms from withholding material information and to promote
better functioning capital markets, including the IPO market, the system has also
attracted criticism for being inefficient and too costly. Is firm liability an effective
deterrent? Do the benefits of firm liability outweigh the costs? Instead of having
a one-size-fits-all mandatory system, should the firm be able to design their own
liability system?
The paper has analyzed how the liability system affects a firm’s incentive to disclose material information using a simple game-theoretic model. In the model, the
firm can sell stock to the outside investors to raise capital while deciding whether to
withhold material information from the prospective investors, and the investors can
bring a lawsuit against the firm to recover damages. Investors are rational and forward
looking, and anticipate being plaintiffs in future litigation in case non-disclosure is
uncovered. The paper has shown that the equilibrium (non-disclosure and financing)
depends on a number of factors, including the amount of personal capital that the
entrepreneur needs to invest, the size of damages that the investors can recover, the
frequency with which the entrepreneur is privately informed (the degree of adverse
42

According to Bohn and Choi (1996), over 90% of securities class actions end in settlement. See
also Choi, Choi, and Pritchard (2022). Lowry and Shu (2002) shows that the average settlement
size, which did not include litigation costs, is about 11% of the total proceeds raised at IPOs.
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selection), and the cost of litigation.
Building on the analysis, the paper examined several policy proposals, in particular, whether to allow firms to choose their own liability system with either a liability
waiver or a class action waiver. We showed that the firms’ choice of liability system
may or may not align with the socially optimal choice. The reason for the divergence
comes from the fact that while the firms care about maximizing their own profits
(and not about disclosure per se), social welfare depends on deterring strategic nondisclosure and minimizing the deadweight loss from litigation. The analysis showed
that the firms may have an excessive incentive to opt into a costly litigation system
to reduce their cost of capital.43 The divergence is especially pronounced when litigation is costly and the level of deterrence is already low (because damages are small,
adverse selection isn’t as severe, or both), and promoting litigation will lead to a
larger welfare loss. When such divergence is likely, shrinking or eliminating liability
for non-disclosure can potentially increase social welfare.
Our simple model abstracted from several relevant factors, including externalities
on third parties and the bounded rationality of investors. If the returns from litigation
are captured in part by non-investing third parties, such as the lawyers representing
investor class, the link between ex post liability and ex ante financing cost becomes
more tenuous. Other factors, such as investor myopia and settlement (that benefits
third parties at the expense of investors), can also come into play. When these
factors are taken into account, the private incentives to opt out of costly litigation
(with liability waivers or class action waivers) may be socially excessive rather than
socially insufficient. We intend to analyze these factors in future research.

43

Intuitively, if investors are fully rational and expect the future returns from litigation, they
would be willing to finance a firm’s investment at a lower cost.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium where the u-type participates with
positive probability. Suppose there is no disclosure and let bh , bu , bl be the capital
market’s conditional beliefs where bh + bu + bl = 1 where bu ∈ (0, 1]. Since outside
investors break even, α∗ satisfies
bh α∗ xh + bu α∗ x + bl (d + α∗ (xl − d)) − c = 0.

(32)

We will prove bh = 0 (the h-type does not pool with the u-type) and that α∗ ≥ c/x.
First consider a PBNE where the l-type does not participate, bl = 0. Suppose
that conditional no disclosure, the market believes bh > 0 and bu > 0. In this
case, α∗ ∈ xch , xc . This isn’t a PBNE since the h-type would disclose and secure
αh = xch . Suppose instead that the market believes bu = 0 and bh = 1. In this case,
α∗ = αh = c/xh . This isn’t a PBBE since the u-type would participate. Therefore in
a PBNE with bl = 0 we have bh = 0, bu = 1, and α∗ = c/x.
Next consider a PBNE where the l-type participates with positive probability,
bl > 0. The l-type’s payoff is (1−α∗ )(xl −d)−e ≥ 0. Rearranging gives d+α∗ (xl −d) ≤
xl − e. Substituting into the investors’ break-even condition (32),
bh α∗ xh + bu α∗ x + bl (xl − e) − c ≥ 0.

(33)

We can prove α∗ ≥ c/x by contraction. Suppose first that that α∗ ≤ c/xh < c/x.
Substituting into (33),

Since

x
xh

bh c + bu xxh c + bl (xl − e) − c ≥ 0.

(34)

bh c + bu c + bl (xl − e) − c = bl (xl − e − c) > 0.

(35)

< 1, this implies

This is a contradiction since xl − e − c < 0. Therefore α∗ > c/xh . Next, suppose
α∗ ∈ (c/xh , c/x). The h-type will disclose and secure αh = c/xh < α∗ and so bh = 0.
Substituting into (33),
bu c + bl (xl − e) − c = bl (xl − e − c) > 0,

(36)

a contradiction. Therefore α∗ ≥ c/x. This completes the proof that if the u-type
participates with positive probability then the h-type discloses and the equity stake
conditional on non-disclosure is α∗ ≥ c/x.
35
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Proof of Lemma 2. Note that β ∗ = 0, α∗ = α = c/x defined in (3), and d = d
defined in (4) satisfy equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) with equality.
Suppose that d > d. We will prove that β ∗ = 0 by contradiction. Suppose not:
β ∗ > 0. Condition (1) implies that (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e ≥ 0, and so α∗ < α.
Condition (1) also implies that α∗ (xl − d) ≥ xl − d − e. Substituting this into (2)
gives (1 − π)(α∗ x − c) + πqβ ∗ (xl − k) ≥ 0. Solving for α∗ and using the definition of
α in (3) gives
πqβ ∗ k − xl
α∗ ≥ α +
·
.
(37)
1−π
x
If β ∗ > 0 then α∗ > α, a contradiction. Thus, if d > d then β ∗ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. We will prove that if d < d(π) defined in (5) then β ∗ = 1. To
do this, we will prove that if β ∗ < 1 then d ≥ d(π).
Suppose β ∗ < 1. Condition (1) implies (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e ≤ 0. Rearranging,
α (xl − d) ≥ xl − d − e. Substituting into (2) gives (1 − π)(α∗ x − c) + πqβ ∗ (xl − k) ≤ 0.
Solving for α∗ gives:
πqβ ∗ k − xl
c
·
.
α∗ ≤ +
x 1−π
x
Since β ∗ < 1 by assumption, and using the definition of r(π) in (6),
∗

α∗ <

c
+ r(π).
x

Next, since condition (1) implies (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e ≤ 0 we have
d ≥ xl −

e
.
1 − α∗

Substituting α∗ < c/x + r(π), gives
d > xl −

e
.
1 − c/x − r(π)

The right-hand side is d(π) defined in (5). This establishes that if β ∗ < 1 then
d ≥ d(π). Therefore if d < d(π) then β ∗ = 1.
Note that the right-hand side may be positive or negative. Since r(π) in (6) is an
increasing function of π with r(0) = 0 and limπ→1 r(π) = ∞, there exists a unique
threshold π
b0 where the right-hand side equals zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. Case 1. The full deterrence result follows from Lemma 2.
36
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Case 2. The partial deterrence result may be found by solving (7) and (8) simultaneously. The comparative statics are immediate.
Case 3. In the no-deterrence range, the equilibrium α∗ (d, π) in (11) may be found by
setting β ∗ = 1 in the investors’ break-even condition (2). Notice that α∗ (d, 0) = α =
c/x > 0 and α∗ (0, π) > 0 for all π ∈ (0, 1). We will show that α∗ (d, π) is decreasing
in d and increasing in π. Letting z = πq/(1 − π), rewrite (11)
α∗ (d, π) =

c + z(c − d)
.
x + z(xl − d)

First, we show that α∗ is an increasing function of x. When we differentiate with
respect to z, we get:
∂α∗ (d, π)
(x + z(xl − d))(c − d) − (c + z(c − d))(xl − d)
=
∂z
(x + z(xl − d))2
=

x(c − d) − c(xl − d)
(x + z(xl − d))2

=

c(x − xl ) − d(x − c)
.
(x + z(xl − d))2

The numerator is positive if
d<

c(x − xl )
x−c

The right-hand side is larger than d defined in (4) above. To prove this,
e
ex
xl (x − c) − ex
c(x − xl )
< d = xl −
= xl −
=
x−c
1 − c/x
x−c
x−c
This is true if and only if
c(x − xl ) < xl (x − c) − ex = cx − xl x + ex = x(c + e − xl ) < 0,
which is true because c + e + xl = k − xl < 0 by assumption. So the numerator is
positive for all d < d. Thus α∗ is an increasing function of z and by extension π.
Next we show that α∗ (d, π) is a decreasing in d. Differentiating with respect to d, we
get:
∂α∗ (d, π)
(x + z(xl − d))(−z) − (c + z(c − d))(−z)
=
.
∂d
(x + z(xl − d))2
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The denominator is positive. The numerator is negative if
−x − z(xl − d) + c + z(c − d) < 0
−x − zxl + c + zc < 0
−z(xl − c) − (x − c) < 0.
Recall that z = πq/(1 − π) > 0 for all π ∈ (0, 1) and our assumption that max{e, c} <
xl implies that x − c > xl − c > 0. Therefore the left-hand side is negative. We have
established that α∗ is a decreasing function of d and this completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the three cases in Proposition 2.
Case 1. The l-types are fully deterred, β ∗ (d, π) = 0, and α∗ = c/x. From (12), social
welfare
SW (d, π) = (1 − π)(x − k) + π(1 − q)(xh − k).
Differentiating with respect to π,
∂SW (d, π)
= −(x − k) + (1 − q)(xh − k).
∂π
Substituting x = qxl + (1 − q)xh , we get:
= −qxl − (1 − q)xh + k + (1 − q)xh − k + qk
= −qxl + qk = q(k − xl ) > 0.
Therefore social welfare is an increasing function of π in case 1.
Case 2. The l-type is indifferent and therefore gets a payoff of zero for all d and π.
The u-type’s payoff is (1 − α∗ (d, π))x − e > 0. Since α∗ (d, π) in (9) is decreasing in d
and invariant to π. Using β ∗ (d, π) in (10), social welfare in (12) becomes

 
SW (d, π) = (1 − π)(x − k) + π(1 − q)(xh − k) + (1 − π) c − 1 − xle−d x .

 
∂SW (d, π)
= −(x − k) + (1 − q)(xh − k) − c − 1 − xle−d x .
∂π
The right-hand side is a decreasing function of d for all d < xl . So if the right-hand
side is positive when d = d, it is positive for all d < d. The third term is equal to
zero when d = d defined in (4), so
∂SW (0, π)
= −(x − k) + (1 − q)(xh − k).
∂π
38
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Substituting for x and rearranging confirms that this is positive (see the proof in case
1). This confirms that social welfare is increasing in π in case 2.
Case 3. Since β ∗ (d, π) = 1 and there is full participation of l-type, social welfare
in (12) is SW (d, π) = x − k; it does not depend on d or π. α∗ (d, π) defined in
(11) is decreasing in d and increasing in π. Therefore the u-type’s payoff, (1 −
α∗ (d, π))x − e > 0, is increasing in d and decreasing in π. The l-type’s payoff is
(1 − α∗ (d, π))(xl − d) − e > 0. This is decreasing in d. Since social welfare SW (d, π)
is independent of d, and the h-type aggregate payoff is independent of d, it follows
that the l-type payoff is decreasing in d.

Proof of Proposition 3. Case 1. As in Lemma 1, investors demand α∗ ≥ c/x. The
l-type is fully deterred if (1 − α∗ )xl − e − d < 0 or d > dEL in equation (14).
Case 2. The investors’ break-even condition is
(1 − π)(α∗ x − c) + πqβ ∗ (α∗ xl − c + d) = 0.

(38)

∗
∗
(d, π) in (17) may be found by solving the
in (16) and βEL
The expressions for αEL
l-type’s break-even condition (13) and the investors’ break-even condition (38) simultaneously. The comparative statics are immediate.
∗
Case 3. In the no-deterrence range, the equilibrium αEL
(d, π) in (18) may be found
∗
by setting β = 1 in the investors’ break-even condition (38). Rearranging,

α∗ [(1 − π)x + πqxl ] = (1 − π)c + πq(c − d).
Dividing through by (1 − π)x + πqxl gives (18).

Corollary 3 (Comparative Statics on Entrepreneur Liability Case). Suppose
that the entrepreneur is held personally liable for non-disclosure.
1. The l-type’s payoff is (weakly) decreasing in d, the u-type’s payoff is (weakly)
increasing in d, and social welfare is (weakly) increasing in d.
2. Compared to the baseline model where the investors collect damages from the
firm, the l-type entrepreneur’s payoff is (weakly) lower, the the u-type’s payoff
is (weakly) higher, and social welfare is (weakly) higher.
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Proof of Corollary 3. Consider the three cases in Proposition 3.
∗
Case 1. Since βEL
(d, π) = 0 social welfare and private payoffs do not depend on d.
∗
Case 2. Since βEL
(d, π) in (17) is decreasing in d we have that social welfare in (12)
∗
is increasing in d. Since αEL
(d, π) in (16) is decreasing in d, the u-type is better off
when d rises. The l-type is indifferent and gets a payoff of zero.
∗
∗
Case 3. Since βEL
(d, π) = 1 social welfare does not depend on d. Since αEL
(d, π) in
(18) is decreasing in d, the u-type is better off when d increases. Since social welfare
does not depend on d, the l-type is worse off when d increases.

Proof of Proposition 4. Let’s first start with the full deterrence case (β ∗ = 0).
When only the u-type participates in financing, the investors’ equilibrium break-even
condition is given by:
(1 − π)(α∗ x − c + q(1 − α)λd) = 0.
Compared to the case without any false positives (λ = 0), in equilibrium, the investors receive a litigation return of (1 − α)λd from the u-type when xl is realized,
which happens with probability q. From this, we get the equilibrium fraction for the
investors:
c − qλd
α∗ =
x − qλd
c−qλd
< xc . Also, ∂α
= −qd(x−c)
< 0 and ∂α
= −qλ(x−c)
< 0.
Whenever λ > 0, x−qλd
∂λ
(x−qλd)2
∂d
(x−qλd)2
Compared to the baseline case (λ = 0), because the investors get additional return
from the u-type through litigation, the equilibrium fraction for the investors is lower.

To ensure that the l-type is fully deterred, we need: (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e < 0. Let d
be given by: (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e = 0. When we substitute in the expression for α∗
and simplify, we get:
(x − c)xl − ex
dF P (e) =
.
x − c − eqλ
ex
l −ex
When λ = 0, we get dF P (e) = (x−c)x
= xl − x−c
= d(e). Compared to the baseline
x−c−eqλ
case, a stronger liability is necessary to fully deter the l-type from participating.

Now, suppose we are in the partial deterrence region (β ∗ ∈ (0, 1)). The l-type’s
indifference condition is given by (1 − α∗ )(xl − d) − e = 0, from which we get:
α∗ = 1 − xle−d . We can see that when the l-type is indifferent, the u-type strictly
40
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prefers to participate: (1 − α∗ )(x − qλd) − e > 0. The investors’ break-even condition
is given by:
(1 − π)(α∗ x − c + qλd(1 − α∗ )) + πqβ ∗ (α∗ xl − c + (1 − α∗ )d) = 0.
When we use the equality α∗ (xl − d) = xl − d − e and simplify, we get the equilibrium
participation rate by the l-type:
β∗ =

1 − π α∗ (x − qλd) − c + qλd
·
.
πq
k − xl
∗

x−c
.
Recall that, in the baseline case, we had: α∗ = 1 − xle−d and β ∗ = 1−π
· αk−x
πq
l
Compared to the baseline case, therefore, conditional on d, whenever λ > 0, the
l-type’s participation rate is strictly higher and, therefore, the social welfare lower.
Although the equilibrium fraction (α∗ ) that the investors receive from the l-type
(conditional on d) is the same, because the investors get a positive litigation return
from the u-type, compared to the baseline case, their return is strictly higher. To
satisfy their break-even condition, therefore, the l-type’s equilibrium participation
∗
e
∂α∗
= − (xl −d)
= 0,
rate (β ∗ ) has to be higher. Finally, we see that: ∂α
2 < 0,
∂d
∂π
∂β ∗
∂d

∗

∗

α (x−qλd)−c+qλd
∂β
e
1
< 0. As in the baseline
= (xl −d)
2 (−x + qλxl ) < 0, and ∂π = − πq ·
k−xl
case, when the liability gets stronger, social welfare improves.

To establish dF P (e, π), let’s examine the no deterrence case (β ∗ = 1). When β ∗ = 1,
the investors’ break-even condition is given by:
(1 − π)(α∗ (x − qλd) − c + qλd) + πq(α∗ (xl − d) − c + d) = 0,
from which, we get α∗ =

(1−π)(c−qλd)+πq(c−d)
.
(1−π)(x−qλd)+πq(xl −d)

A few preliminary observations regarding the α∗ . From the equation (1 − π)(α(x −
qλd) − c + qλd) + πq(α(xl − d) − c + d) = 0, we see that the left hand side is
strictly increasing with respect to α. We also know that, in equilibrium, α∗ x − c +
qλd(1 − α∗ ) > 0 and α∗ xl − c + (1 − α∗ )d < 0. Hence, when π increases, investors’
∗
return goes down, and to restore equality, α∗ must increase. Hence, ∂α
> 0. Also,
∂π
(1−π)(α(x−qλd)−c+qλd)+πq(α(xl −d)−c+d) is strictly increasing with respect to
d. When d rises, therefore, to restore the equality, α must decrease. In other words,
∂α∗
< 0. In sum, the equilibrium α∗ is increasing with respect to π and decreasing
∂d
with respect to d.
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To establish dF P (e, π), from the partial deterrence case, we know that:


xl −d−e
(x − qλd) − c + qλd
xl −d
1−π
β∗ =
·
πq
k − xl
When we set β ∗ = 1 and simplify, we get:
1 − π (xl − d − e)(x − qλd) − (xl − d)(c − qλd)
·
= 1.
πq
(xl − d)(k − xl )
When we solve for d, we get:
dF P (e, π) =

(1 − π)(xl (x − c) − ex) − πqxl (k − xl )
.
(1 − π)((x − c) − eqλ) − πq(k − xl )

It’s straightforward (but somewhat messy) to establish that this expression is decreasing with respect to π. When π = 0, we get:
dF P (e, 0) =

xl (x − c) − ex
= d.
(x − c) − eqλ

When dF P (e, π) = 0, we need: (1 − π)(xl (x − c) − ex) − πqxl (k − xl ) = 0, from which
we get:
1−π
b0 xl (x − k) − e(x − xl )
·
= 1.
π
b0 q
xl (k − xl )
Note that this expression is the same as the baseline case and π
b0 < 1. Therefore,
dF P (e, π) ∈ [0, d] when π ∈ [0, π
b0 ].
Corollary 4 (Comparative Statics in False Positives Case). Suppose that the
firm is erroneously held liable for λd when the entrepreneur is uninformed.
1. The l-type’s payoff is (weakly) decreasing in d, the u-type’s payoff is (weakly)
increasing in d, and social welfare is (weakly) increasing in d.
2. The l-type’s payoff is (weakly) increasing in λ, the u-type’s payoff is (weakly)
decreasing in λ, and social welfare is (weakly) decreasing in λ.
Proof of Corollary 4. Consider the three cases in Proposition 4.
Case 1. Since βF∗ P (d, π) = 0 social welfare and the l-type and u-type payoffs do not
depend on d or λ.
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Case 2. βF∗ P (d, π) in (23) is increasing in λ because

− 1 − xle−d + 1 = xle−d > 0.
Therefore social welfare is decreasing in λ. βF∗ P (d, π) in (23) is decreasing in d if


∂ 
e
1 − xl −d (x − qλd) − (c − qλd) < 0.
∂d


∂ 
x − c − xle−d (x − qλd) < 0.
∂d
Differentiating, and dividing by e,
−

(xl − d)(−qλ) − (x − qλd)(−1)
< 0.
(xl − d)2
−

x − qλxl
<0
(xl − d)2

Therefore, social welfare is increasing in d. The l-type is indifferent and gets zero
profits. It follows that the u-type’s payoff is decreasing in λ and increasing in d.
Case 3. Since βF∗ P (d, π) = 1 social welfare does not depend on d or λ. Letting
z = πq/(1 − π), the equity stake is
αF∗ P (·) =

(c − qλd) + z(c − d)
(x − qλd) + z(xl − d)

Consider first the comparative statics with respect to λ. Differentiating αF∗ P (·) with
respect to λ, the slope has the same sign as
[(x − qλd) + z(xl − d)](−qd) − [(c − qλd) + z(c − d)](−qd)
which has the same sign as
−(x − qλd) − z(xl − d) + (c − qλd) + z(c − d)
= −x − zxl + c + zc
= −(x − c) − z(xl − c) < 0
Therefore αF∗ P (·) is decreasing in λ. The l-type’s payoff is (1 − αF∗ P )(xl − d) − e > 0.
Since αF∗ P (·) is decreasing in λ, the l-type’s payoff is increasing in λ. Since social
welfare is constant in λ, the u-type’s payoff (1 − αF∗ P )(x − λd) − e > 0 must be
43

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4056233

43

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 220 [2022]

decreasing in λ.
Now consider the comparative statics with respect to d. Differentiating αF∗ P (·) with
respect to d, the slope has the same sign as
[(x − qλd) + z(xl − d)](−qλ − z) − [(c − qλd) + z(c − d)](−qλ − z).
The same analysis as was just done for λ verifies that αF∗ P (·) is decreasing in d.
Now let’s evaluate the entrepreneur’s payoffs. I will do this indirectly. The slope of
the l-type’s payoff with respect to d is smaller than the slope of the u-type’s payoff
function:
−(1 − αF∗ P ) −

∂α∗F P (·)
(xl
∂d

∂α∗F P (·)
(x
∂d

− d) < −(1 − αF∗ P )λ −

∂α∗F P (·)
(x
∂d

− λd)

− xl + (1 − λ)d) − (1 − αF∗ P )(1 − λ) < 0

∂α∗ (·)

This is true since F∂dP < 0. Since the slope of the social welfare function with
respect to d is zero, it must be that the partial derivative of the l-type’s payoff function
is negative and the partial derivative of the u-type’s payoff function is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. We start with the construction of the full deterrence threshold, dLC . In order to have a sufficiently high d so as to fully deter the l-type (with
litigation), we need: (1 − α)(xl − d − φd ) − e < 0. When we let d = dLC and solve
(1 − α)(xl − dLC − φd ) − e = 0 for dLC , we get:
dLC = xl − φd −

ex
.
x−c

e
Note that dLC < xl − 1−c/x
. Because of the positive litigation cost (φd ), compared
to the case without litigation cost, a weaker liability is necessary to achieve full
∗
= xc and the l-type is
deterrence. Hence, when d > dLC , the investors demand αLC
∗
fully deterred: βLC = 0.

Second, suppose that we are in the partial deterrence region. Suppose, first, that the
litigation is credible. For the l-type’s indifference, we need: (1−α)(xl −d−φd )−e = 0.
The investors’ break-even condition is: (1 − π)(αx − c) + πqβ(αxl − c + d − φp − α(d +
φd )) = 0. From the l-type indifference condition, we get the equilibrium α:
∗
αLC
(d, π) =

xl − d − φd − e
.
xl − d − φd

∗
Note that αLC
(d, π) is independent of π but is decreasing with respect to d. With
∗
αLC (d, π), the investors’ break-even condition can be written as: (1 − π)(αx − c) +
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πqβ(xl − k − φ) = 0 and we get the equilibrium participation rate for the l-type:
1−π
πq
1−π
=
πq

∗
βLC
(d, π) =

∗
αLC
(d, π) · x − c
k + φ − xl
(xl − d − φd − e)x − c(xl − d − φd )
·
.
(xl − d − φd )(k + φ − xl )

·

d−φp
, this implies that
d+φd
xl −d0 −φd −e
p
.
binds: xl −d0 −φd = dd00 −φ
+φd

Given the litigation credibility condition of α ≤

such that the litigation credibility constraint
solve for d0 , we get:
xl φ − φd (e + φ)
dpd
.
0 (π) =
e+φ

∃ d0 > φ p
When we

The superscript “pd ” stands for the fact that we are defining d0 in the partial
deterrence region. In the partial deterrence region, therefore, litigation is credixl −e
∗
d (e+φ)
ble only when d ≥ xl φ−φ
. When d < dpd
and
0 (π), we get: αLC (d, π) =
e+φ
xl
∗
βLC
(d, π) =

1−π
πq

·

(xl −e)x−cxl
.
xl (k−xl )

Third, suppose we are in the no deterrence region. Suppose, initially, that the
litigation is credible. In equilibrium, the l-type participates with probability one
∗
(βLC
(d, π) = 1) and makes, in expectation: (1 − α)(xl − d − φd ) − e > 0. From the
investors’ break-even condition of (1−π)(αx−c)+πq(αxl −c+d−φp −α(d+φd )) = 0,
we get:
(1 − π)c + πq(c − d + φp )
∗
.
αLC
(d, π) =
(1 − π)x + πq(xl − d − φd )
∂α∗ (d,π)

∂α∗ (d,π)

Though a bit tedious, it is straightforward to show that LC∂π
> 0 and LC∂d
0. In the no deterrence region, the litigation credibility condition is given by:

<

d − φp
(1 − π)c + πq(c − d + φp )
.
≤
(1 − π)x + πq(xl − d − φd )
d + φd
When we solve for d, we find the expression for dnd
0 (π) (superscript “nd ” standing for
“no deterrence”):
dnd
0 (π) =

((1 − π)c + πqc)φd + ((1 − π)x + πqxl )φp
.
(1 − π)(x − c) + πq(xl − c)
∂dnd (π)

Though bit tedious, it is straightforward to show that 0∂π > 0. Note that when
cφd +xφp
π = 0, we get dnd
> φp . Hence, to satisfy the litigation credibility
0 (0) =
x−c
constraint, damages will always be higher than φp . Also, when d < dnd
0 (0), the
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∗
∗
equilibrium is given by: βLC
(d, π) = 1 and αLC
(d, π) =
1−π (xl −e)x−cxl
· xl (k−xl )
πq

∗
βLC
(d, π) =
and rearrange, we get:

(1−π)c+πqc
.
(1−π)x+πqxl

Note that, from

∗
in the partial deterrence region, when we let βLC
(d, π) = 1

1−π
xl (k − xl )
=
.
πq
(xl − e)x − cxl
This is the same expression that defined π
b0 . Therefore, conditional on no credible
litigation, we get partial deterrence when π > π
b0 , and no deterrence when π ≤ π
b0 .
So far, we have established the function d0 (π) in two separate regions: one in partial
nd
deterrence (dpd
0 (π)), and the other in no deterrence (d0 (π)) region. To establish
the continuity, we first find the expression for dLC (π) and then show that d0 (π) is
continuous. In order to find dLC (π), from the partial deterrence region, we know that
∗
βLC
(d, π) =

1 − π (xl − d − φd − e)x − c(xl − d − φd )
·
.
πq
(xl − d − φd )(k + φ − xl )

∗
(d, π) → 1 and we rearrange, we get:
When βLC

π
b(d)q
(xl − d − φd − e)x − c(xl − d − φd )
=
.
(1 − π
b(d))
(xl − d − φd )(k + φ − xl )
This equality implicitly defines dLC (π). It is straightforward to establish that ∂bπ∂d(d) < 0
∂d (π)
or, equivalently, LC
< 0. When π
b = 0, for instance, we get dLC (0) = xl − φd −
∂π
ex
= dLC .
x−c
To show that d0 (π) is continuous across the two regions, first, when we can rewrite
the expression for dnd
0 (π) and get:


1−π
πq

nd

cφd + xl φp − (xl − c)dnd
0 (π)
=
.
nd
(x − c)d0 (π) − cφd − xφp

The superscript “nd ” on the left hand side is to indicate that the ratio is being
evaluated in the no deterrence region. From the partial deterrence region, we know
xl φ−φd (e+φ)
xl φ−φd (e+φ)
that dpd
. When we let dnd
and rearrange the above
0 (π) =
0 (π) =
e+φ
e+φ
expression, we get:


1−π
πq

nd
=
d=dpd
0 (π)

xl (e + φ − xl + c)
.
xl (x − c) − x(e + φ)
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We also know that, from the partial deterrence region, when β ∗ = 1, we have


1−π
πq

pd
=

(xl − d − φd )(k + φ − xl )
.
(xl − d − φd − e)x − c(xl − d − φd )

xl φ−φd (e+φ)
for d, after some algebra,
When we substitute in the expression dpd
0 (π) =
e+φ
we get:

pd
1−π
xl (e + φ − xl + c)
=
.
πq d=dpd (π) xl (x − c) − x(e + φ)
0

This establishes the continuity of d0 (π), which is weakly increasing with respect to π
since d0 (π) is independent of π in the partial deterrence region but is strictly increasing
with respect to π in the no deterrence region.
Proof of Corollary 2. If d > d0 (π) then litigation is credible. Adapting equation
(12) in the baseline model, social welfare is given by:
∗
(d, π)(xl − k − φ).
SWLC (d, π) = (1 − π)(x − k) + π(1 − q)(xh − k) + πqβLC
∗
(d, π) = 0. This is case 1 of Proposition 5. The third term in the
Case 1: βLC
social welfare function is zero. Therefore, social welfare and each type’s payoffs are
independent of the parameters (φ and d).

e
∗
∗
Case 2: βLC
(d, π) ∈ (0, 1). This is case 2 of Proposition 5. αLC
(d, π) = 1 − xl −d−φ
d
is a decreasing function of φd and d, and is independent of φp . Therefore, the u-type’s
return increases when φd or d increase but is independent of φp . Using the expression
∗
(d, π), the social welfare function can be written as:
for βLC



e
SWLC (d, π) = (1 − π)(x − k) + π(1 − q)(xh − k) − (1 − π)
1−
x−c .
xl − d − φd

From the expression, it is clear that social welfare rises when φd or d increases but
is independent of φp . Given the l-type’s indifference, the l-type’s return is unaffected
by φ and d.
∗
Case 3: βLC
(d, π) = 1. This is case 3 of Proposition 5. Social welfare is strictly
∗
decreasing in φp and φd and does not depend on d. Since αLC
(d, π) is an increasing
function of both φp and φd , it follows that the u-type and the l-type payoffs are also
decreasing in φp and φd .
∗
We will now prove that αLC
(d, π) is a decreasing function of d. The u-type’s and l∗
∗
(d, π))(xl −d−φd )−e, respectively.
type’s payoffs are (1−αLC (d, π))x−e, and (1−αLC
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∗

Differentiating with respect to d gives the slopes of the payoff functions: − ∂α∂d(·) x and
∗
∗
− ∂α∂d(·) (xl − d − φd ) − (1 − αLC
(d, π)).
∗

∗

We will now prove ∂α∂d(·) < 0 by contradiction. If ∂α∂d(·) > 0 then the payoffs of the
u-type and l-type would both be decreasing∗ in d. This is a contraction, as social
welfare does not depend on d. Therefore ∂α∂d(·) < 0. This implies that the u-type’s
payoff is an increasing function of d and, since social welfare is independent of d, that
the l-type’s payoff is decreasing in d.
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